

To run or not to run (again) for political office... at the crossroads between public values and self-interested benefits

Insights from the Canton of Ticino

Daniela Cristofoli

*Swiss Public Administration Network and Faculty of Economics, Università della Svizzera italiana USI,
Via Giuseppe Buffi 13, 6904 Lugano, Svizzera*

Paolo Crugnola

*Centre for Local Authorities Training of the State and Government of the Canton of Ticino
(Centro di formazione per gli Enti locali CEFL), Stabile Icaro, via Mirasole 1, 6500 Bellinzona, Svizzera*

What motivates people to run (or run again) for political office? Politics is an ideology-based activity, but is the desire to serve the State and contribute to people's well-being enough to motivate people? Or are personal and self-interested benefits (like prestige and reputation, or remuneration and career opportunities) able to influence the willingness to run as well? At a time when political ideology seems to be going through a crisis, and politicians' wages and privileges are being questioned in many countries worldwide, our paper aims to explore what matters (and what matters most) when the decision to engage in politics is made. The data come from a survey administered last year to politicians holding an office in the municipalities of the Canton of Ticino (Councillors, Commissioners and Mayors).

Keywords: politicians, public values, self-interested benefits

1 Introduction

According to the results of a joint survey conducted last year by the Public Management Area of the University of Lugano and the Centre for Training in Local Authorities – State and Government of the Canton of Ticino (Cristofoli and Crugnola, 2011), politicians currently holding an office in the municipalities of the Canton of Ticino mainly engage in politics due to altruistic and ideology-based values. However, at the same time they seem to perceive a gap between the increasing amount of effort required by political activity and what it offers in return, in terms of personal and self-interested benefits (like prestige and reputation or remuneration and career opportunities). As a result, fewer than 50% of current politicians say that they are prepared to run again in the next elections.

The aim of our paper is to explore the reasons behind this situation. More specifically, our paper seeks to understand what matters (and matters most) when people decide to run for political office. It sheds light on the factors at the crossroads between public values and self-interested benefits.

The theoretical framework for our study is provided by public administration and public management literature on work motivation. In particular, by taking advantages of the collaboration developed within the Swiss Public Administration Network¹, we based our analysis on the theoretical framework elaborated by Anderfuhren-Biget et al. (2010) regarding the motivation of civil servants in the German-speaking and French-speaking parts of Switzerland.

The data for our analysis come from the abovementioned survey (Cristofoli and Crugnola, 2011). From May to June 2011, a questionnaire was administered to all of the politicians holding an office in the municipalities of the Canton of Ticino (Mayors, Commissioners, Councillors) and 1,019 of them participated in our survey.

Below, we will describe the characteristics of political life in Switzerland in general, and in the Canton of Ticino in particular, then we will present the main findings of the public administration and management literature regarding the factors that motivate people to serve the State. Subsequently, we will describe the study method and present its results. Finally, we will discuss ways to encourage people to engage in politics.

2 Running for political office in the Canton of Ticino: the militia principle and the challenges of the new millennium²

Traditionally, engagement in politics by citizens follows two alternative models. The first model dominated politics until the end of the 19th century. Only people from the upper social classes could enter politics, as they were the only ones who could devote time and resources to serving the State without receiving anything in return. The second model crept in during the 20th century, thanks to the extension of voting rights and the development of “mass parties”. This led to the “democratization” of political careers and the formation of a class of “professional politicians” who were fully committed to political activity and remunerated for it.

Almost all European Countries have shifted from the first to the second model, with the well-known exception of Switzerland (Mazzoleni and Stanga, 2003), where serving the State continues to be a part-time, unremunerated activity (due to the “militia principle” in political activity, which reflects the ideas behind the Swiss army). The result is an “army” of non-professional and unremunerated politicians who continue to do their regular jobs while also serving the State.

Having been a dominant characteristic of political engagement for years, the militia principle has recently started to show its first signs of weakness.

¹ See www.swipan.ch.

² The focus is on Parliamentarians who do indeed work according to the militia principle. Members of the executive might receive a (sometimes quite reasonable) salary.

According to Linder (1999), on a federal level the growing complexity of political activity is placing increasing demands on politicians in terms of time and resources, leaving them less and less time to focus on their normal jobs. In this situation, the militia principle has had two main consequences. Firstly, people are taking on a number of roles at the same time in order to obtain remuneration that is commensurate with their efforts (for example, they may be politicians elected in the Federal Parliament while also serving in positions such as directors on the boards of public enterprises and expert members of government commissions). Secondly, the militia principle means that political engagement is only a possibility for elite professionals, who tend to have more time and resources to devote to the State.

Meanwhile Mazzoleni and Stanga (2003) argued that on a Cantonal level the militia principle continues to be a driving force behind the Ticino Parliament, regardless of the growing burden of legislative activity. In a study published in 2003, Mazzoleni and Stanga focused on the number of times that people have been elected to the Cantonal Parliament as a measure of tenure, and therefore of “professionalization”. The evolution from 1920 to 2000 was analysed. According to the results of the study, politicians normally stay in office for 6 years. From 1960, there was a significant reduction in the number of long-tenured parliamentarians. Bearing in mind these results and the fact that serving the State in the Canton of Ticino is still an unremunerated, complementary activity with a high turnover, Mazzoleni and Stanga stated that the Ticino Parliament is more in keeping with the militia principle today than it was in the first half of the 1990s (Mazzoleni and Stanga, 2003: 87).

There are no studies of this kind on a municipal level. The survey conducted by Cristofoli and Crugnola (2011) gives some helpful insights. According to their results, politicians currently holding an office in the municipalities of Ticino have chosen to run in local elections an average of 3.5 times in the last ten years (34% of them have been in office for more than 8 years and 29% for less than 4 years). 88.6% of politicians spend less than 50% of their time serving their municipalities. Furthermore, 75% of current politicians say that they earn less than CHF 5,000 per year (while most of them claim to be actively engaged in politics). Therefore, the abovementioned survey seems to show that the current crop of politicians mainly chose to enter politics due to their altruistic and ideological values. Their desire to serve the State is in keeping with the militia principle. However, at the same time they seem to perceive a gap between the growing demands of political activity and the low remuneration that it offers in return. As a result, fewer than 50% of current politicians say that they are prepared to run again in the next elections.

With all of this in mind, we will focus on the politicians in the municipalities of Ticino and try to understand what motivates them when they decide whether to run (again) for an office. The contrast between the desire to engage in politics

for the benefit of the whole community (in keeping with the militia principle) and the growing perception that they do not receive sufficient remuneration for their efforts makes Ticino an interesting starting point for the exploration of the importance of public values and self-interested benefits as reasons to engage in politics.

Below, we will present the theoretical framework, objective, hypotheses, method and preliminary results of our study.

3 Motivating people to serve the State: theoretical framework

Many studies in public administration and public management literature have tried to understand how to motivate people to serve the State, with different and controversial results.

The factors mentioned may relate to an altruistic or self-interested approach and they can be grouped into different categories: public service motivation (Perry and Wise, 1990; Perry and Hondeghem, 2008), tangible incentives like remuneration and career opportunities (Forest, 2008; Perry et al., 2009), and intangible incentives such as prestige and reputation (Frey and Jegen, 2001; Herzberg et al., 1959).

The altruistic approach originates from the idea of a singular driving force behind the decision to serve the State, which is generally labelled as public service motivation (Perry and Wise, 1990; Perry, 1996). According to this concept, people choose to serve the State due to compassion, self-sacrifice, commitment to the public interest/civic duty and the appeal of politics (Perry, 1996).

The self-interested approach, which has spread within the public sector alongside New Public Management (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Barzelay, 2001), is based on the idea that people do their utmost to serve their own personal interests (Frey and Jegen, 2001). Typically, this leads to the introduction of reward mechanisms (monetary/tangible or non-monetary/intangible incentives) that seek to provide individuals with returns for serving the State. They mainly come in the form of remuneration, career opportunities, prestige and reputation (Warner et al., 1963; Frey and Jegen, 2001; Perry et al., 2009).

In the following section, we will analyse the different factors separately, give a definition of each one and show their ability to motivate people.

Public service motivation: Originally defined as an “individual’s predisposition to respond to motives grounded primarily or uniquely in public institutions or organizations” (Perry and Wise, 1990: 368), the concept of public service motivation was later better specified as “the beliefs, values and attitudes that go beyond self-interest and organizational interest, that concern the interest of a larger political entity and that motivate individuals to act accordingly whenever appropriate” (Vandenabeele, 2007: 547). According to this approach, public service motivation seems to be a peculiarity of people serving the State who are driven by altruistic and ideological values and not only by self-interested factors.

It consists of four dimensions (Perry, 1996): attraction to politics, civic duty, compassion and self-sacrifice.

Tangible incentives: With the diffusion of New Public Management, little by little governments in almost every country in the world have introduced and implemented human resource management practices and instruments in an attempt to reward their more productive employees (Pollit and Bouckaert, 2004). The basic idea was that the inefficiency and low productivity of civil servants were due to the special status that they could count on as part of their civil service work. They had jobs for life with no assessment and enjoyed aspects such as career-based systems and fixed remuneration. These benefits were introduced in order to allow civil servants to be autonomous and impartial in their work and to shield them from political pressure, but they were also deemed responsible for the demotivation and low productivity of civil servants. Against this backdrop, the aim of the New Public Management reforms was to remove all of these benefits and privileges so as to make public employees more similar to private employees (Pollit and Bouckaert, 2004). They would have to strive to achieve the goals set for them and they would be assessed and given appropriate rewards for their results (in terms of career paths and remuneration). In this context, some practices such as position-based systems and performance-related pay were introduced.

Intangible incentives: According to psychological theories, the factors with the highest motivational power are the ones that satisfy highly-ranked needs, such as esteem and self-actualization (Maslow, 1954; Herzberg et al., 1959; Bright, 2009). Public service motivation could undoubtedly be included in this category (Perry and Wise, 1990), but we decided that it deserved separate analysis. The category also includes work characteristics such as prestige, power, reputation, personal well-being, teamwork and working conditions. An activity that is renowned for its prestige and working conditions that do not compromise personal well-being are clearly powerful motivating factors.

The civil service provided the empirical setting for the majority of the abovementioned studies. Recently, they have also been used to investigate the motivation of politicians and they will provide the theoretical framework for our study.

4 Study hypothesis and method

By merging the abovementioned theoretical framework with the characteristics of political activity in the Canton of Ticino, the hypotheses listed below can be formulated (Figure 1).

In particular, we will examine the following predictors of willingness to run for political office: (1) the degree of public service motivation (attraction to politics, civic duty, compassion and self-sacrifice) (as public values); (2) tangible incentives such as remuneration and career opportunities and (3) intangible incentives like the prestige and reputation associated with political activity (as self-

interested benefits). We will also look into the links between working conditions and the perceived level of stress associated with political activity.

Hypothesis 1: The willingness to run for political office in Ticino municipalities is positively related to the attraction to politics.

Hypothesis 2: The willingness to run for political office in Ticino municipalities is positively related to a sense of civic duty.

Hypothesis 3: The willingness to run for political office in Ticino municipalities is positively related to compassion.

Hypothesis 4: The willingness to run for political office in Ticino municipalities is positively related to a sense of self-sacrifice.

Hypothesis 5: The willingness to run for political office in Ticino municipalities is negatively related to the importance given to tangible incentives (such as remuneration and career opportunities).

Hypothesis 6: The willingness to run for political office in Ticino municipalities is positively related to the importance given to intangible incentives (such as prestige and reputation).

Hypothesis 7: The willingness to run for political office in Ticino municipalities is negatively related to the working conditions (such as stress perception).




Figure 1: Factors that encourage and discourage people from engaging in politics: theoretical framework

In order to test the above hypotheses, we conducted a survey. As part of a joint research project conducted within the framework of the Swiss Public Administration Network, the questionnaire had two parts. The first part was an adaptation of the Anderfuhren-Biget et al. (2010), Giaque et al. (2011a; 2011b; 2011c) and Ritz et al. (2011) questionnaire, which was elaborated for a survey of civil servants in the German-speaking and French-speaking parts of Switzerland. Following the lead of the existing literature, the first part of the questionnaire collected data about: willingness to run for political office in the municipalities of Ticino (dummy variable, yes, no) and some of its predictors (measured with a Lickert scale of 1-5, with 1 meaning “I completely disagree” and 5 meaning “I completely agree”); attraction to politics; civic duty; compassion; self-sacrifice; and the importance given to remuneration and career opportunities; having a prestigious, highly-regarded position; and the stress associated with political activity. The second part collected data about the socio-demographic characteristics of the interviewees: gender, age, education, remuneration and tenure.

In accordance with the rules on how to conduct a good survey, the first draft of the questionnaire was tested on five local politicians. They confirmed the face validity of most of the questionnaire items. However, for some items it was necessary to change the wording in order to cater better to the specific nature of the political environment in Ticino.

The questionnaire was administered in both paper-based and electronic formats. Thanks to the support of the Cantonal Government, politicians were directly, personally contacted. When this was not possible, the Mayor was asked to take responsibility for promoting and distributing the questionnaire among the municipality’s elected politicians.

The data collection process started in May 2011 and it was concluded in June 2011. A reminder was sent out to everyone two weeks before the deadline.

The questionnaire was administered to all of the politicians holding political office in the municipalities of Ticino: 156 Mayors, 155 Deputy Mayors, 3,149 Councillors and 511 Commissioners were surveyed. 1,019 of them agreed to participate in our survey, giving a response rate of 25.7%. Due to some missing values, we were forced to delete 27 records from our analysis, so in the end we were able to count on 992 records to test the study hypotheses.

In total, 5% of the respondents were City Mayors, 72% were Councillors and 20% were Commissioners (Table 1). 5% have a public position in municipalities with more than 10,000 inhabitants and 23% in municipalities with fewer than 1,000 inhabitants. 24% of the politicians surveyed were women, 7% of the respondents were younger than 30 years old and 19% were older than 60. As far as education is concerned, 60% of the respondents have completed high school, 29% have a university degree and 4% have a Master’s degree or PhD. In terms of remuneration, 75% of the elected politicians stated that they were paid less than CHF 5,000 for their work. As for their professional backgrounds, 41% came from

the public sector and 49 % from the private sector. 74% of the respondents had run for office more than once.

N	992
Size of the Municipality	
< 500 inhabitants	6%
500 < 1,000	17%
1,000 < 1,500	17%
1,500 < 2,500	21%
2,500 < 5,000	21%
5,000 < 10,000	10%
10,000 < 20,000	3%
> 20,000	2%
NA	3%
Gender	
Male	72%
Female	24%
NA	4%
Age	
20–25	2%
26–30	5%
31–35	6%
36–40	8%
41–45	15%
46–50	17%
51–55	14%
56–60	11%
61–65	8%
over 65	11%
NA	3%
Education	
Elementary school	2%
Apprenticeship	27%
High School	33%
College or University degree	29%
PhD or Master's degree	4%
NA	6%

N	992
Former experiences	
Public sector	41 %
Private sector	49 %
Non-profit	6 %
NA	3 %
Political role	
Mayor	5 %
Commissioner	20 %
Councillor	72 %
NA	3 %
Tenure	
Only one political experience	21 %
More than one political experience	74 %
NA	4 %

Table 1: Sample characteristics (N = 992)

Data were analysed through an o-probit regression. Our aim was to identify the factors that influenced the willingness to run for political office. The willingness to run for public office was measured as a categorical variable, with a value of (2) when politicians declared their willingness to run again in the next elections, (1) when politicians said that they had not decided what to do yet, and (0) when politicians were not willing to run. As far as independent variables were considered, the public service motivation dimensions were based on the well-known Perry scale (1996). Table 2 lists the items of the questionnaire that were related to tangible incentives (remuneration and career opportunities), intangible incentives (prestige and reputation) and working conditions (level of stress). Cronbach's Alpha was used to assess the reliability of the items in the questionnaire. Gender, age, education, tenure and remuneration were used as control variables.

Variables	Items and Questions	Statistical coding
Attraction to politics Cronbach's alpha = 0.6465	1. I am very interested in politics. 2. I love my political activity.	All of these items were measured using a 5-point Likert-type scale (1 = strong disagreement, 5 = strong agreement)
Civic duty Cronbach's alpha = 0.6952	1. It is important for me to contribute to the common good. 2. I consider public service to be my civic duty. 3. Meaningful public service is very important to me. 4. I would prefer to see public officials do what is best for the whole community, even if it were against my interests.	
Compassion Cronbach's alpha = 0.7576	1. I am highly moved by the plight of the underprivileged. 2. Most social programmes are too vital to do without. 3. I am often reminded by daily events how dependent we are on one another.	
Self-sacrifice Cronbach's alpha = 0.7442	1. Much of what I do is for a cause bigger than myself. 2. I am one of those rare people who would risk personal loss to help someone else. 3. I think people should give back to society more than they get from it.	
Tangible incentives (remuneration and career) Cronbach's alpha = 0.6756	1. It is important to receive adequate remuneration. 2. It is important to have good career prospects.	
Intangible incentives (prestige and reputation) Cronbach's alpha = 0.6256	1. It is important to have a prestigious role. 2. It is important to receive positive feedback from the people. 3. It is important to receive positive feedback from my family.	
Working conditions (stress) Cronbach's alpha = 0.8349	1. I find my political work very stressful. 2. The stress caused by my political work has a negative impact on my well-being.	
Gender	What is your gender?	Dummy variable: (1) = men, (0) = women
Age	In what year were you born?	No. of years

Variables	Items and Questions	Statistical coding
Education	What is the highest level of education that you have achieved?	Responses coded from 1 (compulsory education) to 7 (PhD)
Tenure	How many times have you run for political office?	No. of times run for political office
Remuneration	What is your gross annual income?	Responses coded from 1 (< 5,000 CHF) to 12 (> 100,000 CHF)
Willingness to run for political office	Are you willing to run in the next elections?	Categorical variable, (2) = Yes, (1) = I do not know, (0) = No

Table 2: Items and Measures

5 Results

Table 3 shows the results of our analysis. Due to the high correlation between age and tenure (the number of times people have run for public office), we dropped the variable tenure from the analysis. Generally speaking, the correlation test did not shed any light on multicollinearity problems.

	B	Std err	P value
Attraction to politics	.1048***	.0232	0.000
Civic duty	.0326	.0204	0.109
Compassion	-.0075	.0193	0.700
Self-sacrifice	-.0035	.0215	0.871
Tangible incentives	-.003	.0217	0.889
Intangible incentives	.0356*	.0186	0.056
Working conditions	-.0841***	.0173	0.000
Gender	.2371**	.0892	0.008
Age	-.0163***	.0033	0.000
Education	.0661**	.022	0.003
Remuneration	-.0044	.0382	0.908
/cut1			
/cut2			
N = 992			
Log likelihood = -976.825***			
LR chi2(11) = 102.02			
Pseudo R2 = 0.0496			
	p* < 0.1	**p < 0.05	***p < 0.01

Table 3: Results

Our study results reveal the positive impact of the attraction to politics on the willingness to run for political office. This is in keeping with hypothesis 1. In particular, politicians who seem to enjoy politics and political bargaining are more likely to continue with their political activity and run in the next elections ($p = .000$). Civic duty (hypothesis 2) ($p = .109$), compassion (hypothesis 3) ($p = .700$) and self-sacrifice (hypothesis 4) ($p = .871$) do not seem to affect the decision to engage in politics.

Beyond these factors, which are related to an altruistic idea of serving the State, politicians currently holding an office in the municipalities of Ticino also seem to be motivated by self-interested factors like prestige and reputation, while some working and stress-related aspects appear to make them less inclined to run. Meanwhile, remuneration and career opportunities do not seem to influence the willingness to run.

As far as intangible incentives are concerned, in fact, prestige (hypothesis 6) seems to have a positive impact on the likelihood of running for public office ($p = .056$), whereas tangible incentives such as remuneration and career opportunities have no influence (hypothesis 5) ($p = .889$).

As supposed by hypothesis 7, the perception of the growing level of stress associated with political activity has a negative impact on the likelihood of someone serving the State and running for public office ($p = .000$).

Last but not least, as far as the control variables are concerned, men seem to be more inclined to run for public office than women and the willingness to serve the State appears to decrease gradually as people get older. It seems also that higher levels of education are positively related to the willingness to run. Remuneration, on the other side, does not seem to affect the choices and behaviour of politicians.

6 Conclusion

According to the results of our analysis, politicians in the Canton of Ticino who engage in politics and serve the State seem to be largely driven by values and beliefs associated with the public interest and love for politics. Personal gain and self-interest do not seem to be so important for the present politicians. In particular, intangible incentives related to the prestige of political activity seem to be taken into account when the decision to engage in politics is made, but tangible incentives like remuneration and career opportunities do not appear to have much influence. One aspect that does have a similar impact to the attraction to politics is the growing level of stress caused by political activity and its effect on personal well-being.

Several questions emerge from these results, that stimulate further investigations: will public values and intangible incentives be able to encourage people to run for office again in the near future, when political activity becomes more and

more complex and causes ever higher levels of stress? Will tangible incentives become an important way of encouraging people to run in that circumstances? Although it is not significant, the correlation between the importance given to tangible incentives and the willingness to run is negative, thus underlining the perception among current politicians of a growing gap between what political activity requires of them and what it offers in return. In order for Swiss citizens to continue to benefit from high levels of public value, may it be necessary to reconsider the militia principles?

Zusammenfassung

Was motiviert Menschen für ein politisches Amt zu kandidieren? Politik basiert auf Ideologien, aber ist der Wunsch dem Land zu dienen und zum Gemeinwohl beizutragen genug, um Menschen zu motivieren? Oder beeinflusst auch persönlicher Eigennutzen (wie z.B. Prestige, Ansehen, Entlohnung oder Karriere-möglichkeiten) die Bereitschaft zu kandidieren? In einer Zeit, in der politische Ideologien in der Krise zu sein scheinen und die Vergütung und Privilegien von Politikern in vielen Ländern weltweit in Frage gestellt werden, möchten wir verstehen, worauf es (am meisten) ankommt, wenn die Entscheidung getroffen wird, sich in der Politik zu engagieren. Die Daten stammen aus einer Umfrage, die letztes Jahr mit amtierenden Politikern (Kommissionsmitglieder, Ratsmitglieder und Gemeindepräsidenten) in Gemeinden des Kantons Tessin durchgeführt worden ist.

Schlagworte: Politiker, Public Value, Eigennutzen

Résumé

Qu'est-ce qui motive les gens à se présenter (ou se représenter) pour des élections politiques? La politique est une activité basée sur l'idéologie, mais est-ce que le désir de servir l'Etat et de contribuer ainsi au bien commun est suffisant pour motiver les gens? Ou sont les bénéfices personnels (comme le prestige et la réputation, ou la rémunération et des perspectives de carrière) aussi capables d'influencer la volonté du candidat? Dans une époque où l'idéologie politique semble être en crise, et les salaires et privilèges des politiciens sont remis en cause dans de nombreux pays, notre article vise à explorer ce qui compte (et ce qui compte le plus) lorsque la décision de s'engager dans la politique est prise. Les données proviennent d'une enquête réalisée l'année dernière sur les politiciens exerçant des fonctions dans les communes du canton du Tessin (membres d'une commission, membres du conseil, et maires).

Mots-Clé: politiciens, valeurs publiques, bénéfices personnels

References

- Anderfuhren-Biget, S., Varone, F., Giauque, D. and Ritz, A. (2010). Motivating Employees of the Public Sector: Does Public Service Motivation Matter? *International Public Management Journal* 13 (3): 213–246.
- Barzelay, M. (2001). *The new public management*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Bright, L. (2009). Why Do Public Employees Desire Intrinsic Non-Monetary Workplace Opportunities? *Public Personnel Management* 38 (3): 15–37.
- Cristofoli, D. and Crugnola, P. (2011), Motivare all'amministrazione della res pubblica. Primo rapporto sulla motivazione di politici e funzionari in Canton Ticino. *Quaderni di Management Pubblico*, n. 1/2011.
- Forest, V. (2008). Performance-Related Pay and Work Motivation: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives for the French Civil Service. *International review of administrative sciences* 74 (2): 325–339.
- Frey, B. S. and Jegen, R. (2001). Motivation Crowding Theory. *Journal of Economic Surveys* 15 (1): 589–611.
- Giauque, D., Ritz, A., Varone, F. and Anderfuhren-Biget, S. (2011a, forthcoming). Resigned but Satisfied. The Negative Impact of Public Service Motivation and Red Tape on Work Satisfaction. *Public Administration*.
- Giauque, D., Anderfuhren-Biget, S. and Varone, F. (2011b, forthcoming). HRM practices, intrinsic motivators and organizational performance in the public sector. *Public Personnel Management*.
- Giauque, D., Ritz, A., Varone, F., Anderfuhren-Biget, S. and Waldner, C. (2011c). Putting public service motivation into context: a balance between universalism and particularism. *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 77 (2): 227–253.
- Herzberg, F. (1971). *Le Travail Et La Nature De L'homme*. Paris: EME.
- Herzberg, F., Mausner, B. and Snyderman, B. (1959). *The Motivation to Work*. New York: Wiley.
- Linder, W. (1999). *Schweizerische Demokratie. Institutionen, Prozesse, Perspektiven*. Bern, Haupt.
- Maslow, A. (1954). *Motivation and Personality*. New-York: Harper & Row.
- Mazzoleni, O. and Stanga, M. (2003). Democratizzazione, milizia, professionismo. Per un profilo del Gran Consiglio ticinese dagli anni '20 ad oggi., *Dati. Statistiche e società*, Anno III, no. 2, June 2003, pp. 78–87.
- Osborne, D. and Gaebler, T. (1992). *Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit Is Transforming the Public Sector*. Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing.
- Natale, P. (2004). *Il sondaggio*, LaTerza editore.
- Perry, J.L. (1996). Measuring Public Service Motivation: An Assessment of Construct Reliability and Validity. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 6 (1): 5–22.
- Perry, J.L. and Hondeghem, A. (2008). Editors' Introduction. pp. 1–14. In: Perry, J.L. and Hondeghem, A. (eds.). *Motivation in Public Management: The Call of Public Service*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Perry, J.L. and Wise, L.R. (1990). The Motivational Bases of Public Service. *Public Administration Review* 50 (3): 367–373.

Perry, J.L., Engbers, T.A. and Jun, S.Y. (2009). Back to the Future? Performance-Related Pay, Empirical Research, and the Perils of Persistence. *Public Administration Review* 69 (1): 39–51.

Pollitt, C. and Bouckaert, G. (2004). *Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ritz, A., Giaouque, D., Varone, F. and Anderfuhren-Biget, S. (2011, forthcoming). From Leadership to Citizenship Behavior in Public Organizations: When Values Matter. *Review of Public Personnel Administration*.

Vandenabeele, W. (2007). Toward a Public Administration Theory of Public Service Motivation: An Institutional Approach. *Public Management Review* 9 (4): 545–556.

